Whither the Non-Aligned Gulf: Sustainable Security or Repackaged Insecurities?

This article first appeared in the SiC Report “The Global South in an Era of Great Power Competition. Click here to access the introduction and a full pdf download of the Report.

By Emma Soubrier, Director of the Pathways to Renewed and Inclusive Security in the Middle East (PRISME) Initiative

Abstract: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations have historically pursued varying degrees of relative balancing, both regionally and globally. This strategy, notably since the 1990s, has been driven by a security dilemma, wherein regimes sought outside protection while mitigating risks from overreliance on a single partner. Through adept diversification of international relations and substantial capital investments, GCC countries have ascended in the Middle East and globally, evolving into a geo-economic center of gravity. Recent developments suggest their inclination towards championing a new Non-Aligned Movement, leveraging multipolar international relations and sidestepping global power competition. This paper analyzes GCC's non-aligned strategies and their underlying narratives, exploring whether they can leverage their newfound status to promote regional de-escalation and sustainable security or perpetuate familiar patterns of insecurity in the MENA region and beyond.

Introduction

The foreign policies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have been at the center of increasing analyses and global attention since the end of the 2000s, as they became more assertive on the regional and international stages. Over the past few years, Global North media coverage of their foreign policy choices has notably focused on how, against the background of the Ukraine War and the Covid-19 pandemic, these countries have operated in non-alignment with (and sometimes in direct opposition to) their traditional Western partners.

Headlines were particularly attentive to the Saudi and Emirati decision (within the OPEC+) to cut oil production in the Fall of 2022 even after the United States (U.S.) and European partners made diplomatic efforts to convince them to increase their production to bring prices down. This move was partly interpreted as a sign of deference to Russia – even if Saudi Arabia in fact allegedly pushed to cut oil production twice as much as Russian President Vladimir Putin requested.¹ Before that, developing ties between China and the GCC countries had also been under scrutiny, notably the 2020 converging vaccine diplomacy between Beijing and Abu Dhabi, the sale of Wing Loong II armed drones to Saudi Arabia and the UAE against the backdrop of the Yemen War, and rumors of a Chinese military base to be built in the UAE.²

As this paper highlights, the strategic positioning of these recent maneuvers is not unheard of; a degree of hedging has long been part of many Gulf countries’ diplomatic DNA. The implication of these demonstrations has, however, evolved.

This trend is critical to understand because these countries have risen individually but also collectively and in articulation with other emerging powers in the Global South. Their new international status will likely affect traditional balances of power or patterns of domination, and contribute to a “post-American world,”³ and perhaps a new era of Western decline. The advent of this era was already accelerated in October 2023 by North American and European reactions to events unfolding in Israel and Palestine.⁴ The invitation of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran to join the BRICS in August 2023 confirms the urgency of this topic, as observers point to a reshuffling of world order,⁵ with this enlarged eco-political alliance embodying the broader trend termed the “Rise of the Rest.” This restructuring raises questions as to whether the rules of the game in such a new world could be different, and notably more cooperative and oriented toward sustainable security.

This paper discusses potential outcomes of the rise of the non-aligned Gulf, which could make positive change towards appeased regional and international orders by improving the wellbeing of the largest number of people. Alternatively, such nonalignment could reinforce traditional patterns of insecurity, however geographically displaced and thematically repackaged they may be.

The Rise of the Non-Aligned Gulf: What’s Really New?

Non- or multi-alignment has always been part of the diplomatic repertoire of the GCC countries, albeit at various levels of intensity. Historically, GCC countries have all demonstrated an interest in pursuing variable degrees of omni-balancing or hedging, both regionally and internationally. For example, Kuwait was the sole small Gulf state to establish diplomatic ties with Moscow before the mid-1980s, in explicit pursuit of a policy of non-alignment, and notably sought Soviet help during the 1986 “tanker war” – prompting Ronald Reagan to offer U.S. protection for the ships. Other small countries of the Arabian Peninsula, particularly the UAE and Qatar, also diversified early on, which was noted as a non-alignment ambition,⁶ and at the very least a desire to step out of the shadow of their Saudi neighbor.

This hedging strategy was anchored in a specific security dilemma, whereby regimes sought the protection of outside powers while trying to offset the risks and insecurities stemming from too heavy a reliance on a unique partner. The trend became even clearer after the 1990s, when the conjunction of the regional and international contexts led many GCC countries to adopt a composite strategy mixing different degrees of bandwagoning and balancing approaches. Most notably, Qatar and the UAE, after signing defense agreements with the U.S. for increased security flexibility in the Arabian Peninsula, sought relative autonomy within their cooperative strategy with the U.S. by forming additional defense agreements with France and the United Kingdom (UK).⁷ On these bases, the success of their strategy towards relative autonomy became much more evident once other conditions (especially significant capital injections) allowed their rise to prominence within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and on the global stage.

By the late 2000s, the changing global economic landscape enabled GCC countries to gain significant sovereignty and leverage, altering their reliance on Western allies. The 2008 financial crisis allowed them to rescue struggling Western economies via sovereign wealth funds, while Western countries’ reduced defense spending and associated ‘existential need to export,’ as domestic markets shrunk, made them even more attractive clients than before in the global arms trade.⁸ These new opportunities provided GCC leaders with newfound leverage to negotiate concessions from Western allies in line with their regional power dynamics and interests.⁹ Against the backdrop of the Arab Spring in 2011, the power vacuum in the MENA region presented GCC nations with another opportunity to enhance their regional standing. This position of strength, buttressed by the accelerated financialization and personalization of global affairs over the past fifteen years,¹⁰ has resulted in many Gulf Cooperation Council countries essentially becoming the geo-economic center of gravity of the Middle East.¹¹ These countries are signaling a new Non-Aligned Movement of sorts, and are ambitious to secure a strategic edge well beyond the region. The main difference with the relative autonomy achieved before is that while the previous period witnessed a continued overall alignment of interests between Gulf countries and Western partners, the rising GCC countries are considering this alignment as less of a factor in their recent policy choices. The turning point arguably came with the events in Egypt during the Summer of 2013. ‍

As the EU and the U.S. contemplated cutting aid to Egypt because of the coup in Egypt and the bloody crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood supporters, leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE offered support to counter potential sanctions. Moreover, they demonstrated their growing influence over their traditional partners, as underscored by Prince Saud al-Faisal’s veiled threat to Western countries: “We will not forget these positions, hostile to Arab and Islamic nations, if they are maintained.”¹² These events around Egypt in 2013 marked a defining moment as Gulf countries not only asserted their regional priorities without seeking Western approval but used their economic diplomacy to insulate themselves from criticism. This was notably visible in the UAE and Egypt conducting airstrikes in Libya during the summer of 2014, targeting Islamic groups supported by Qatar with no prior backing from the U.S. or other key international powers. Such a display of confidence simultaneously diminished potential Western critiques, resulting in a substantial reshaping of Middle East dynamics driven by the pursuit of increasingly divergent policies. Later instances of these new trends included violations of international humanitarian law in Yemen from 2015 on, the advent of the Gulf crisis (2017-2021) and the killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.

While the division of the GCC and the increasing divergence in foreign policies between Gulf nations and their longstanding allies has had many negative consequences, there are unexpected collateral benefits. The disunion of the regional entity during the Trump presidency in the U.S. coupled with heightened self-assurance from leaders of the Arabian Peninsula prevented the formation of a unified anti-Iran front, more aggressive implementation of the “maximum pressure” policy against Tehran as well as the creation of a NATO-like coalition that would have served the converging interests of Washington and Tel Aviv.¹³ The tumultuous U.S. policy towards Iran during these years combined the United States’ failure to act as a security guarantor for the region and its neglect for regional actors’ needs and interests. Such a volatile combination compelled GCC countries to reconsider their own strategy, reopening diplomatic channels with Iran and advancing a slow path toward reconciliation. Another crucial factor in this shift was the emergence of pressing human security risks: risks that transcended political differences and competition and forced Gulf nations to come together to address shared challenges of public health and food security.¹⁴ These developments raise the question of whether the gradual non-alignment of GCC countries could potentially usher in a new era of Gulf security cooperation that extends beyond the region’s boundaries.

Seeds of a New Era – Long Live Sustainable Security

It is critical to consider how GCC countries have articulated their recent strategic stance in a way that does not align too closely or too systematically with their traditional Western partners, as there is a prevailing sense that they stand to lose more than they gain in so doing. GCC leaders are making these decisions against the backdrop of resurging dynamics of global power competition which, across the board, generates more insecurity in the Global South, notably because of how it fuels regional arms races and exacerbates rivalries in resource exploitation.¹⁵ Most GCC countries’ approach involves navigating the complexities of multipolar international relations while consistently avoiding entanglement within them.¹⁶ What helped them gradually distance themselves from their traditional partners was both mounting frustration with the Global North’s assumption that it should lead, and the fact that Global North countries like the U.S. often impose conditions, such as direct and indirect economic sanctions on a given country, with complete disregard for their impact on regional security and stability. While the GCC nations are no strangers to such dynamics, given how their more assertive policy choices reflecting escalating competition among themselves post-Arab Spring led to increased instability in many MENA countries and beyond, particularly in Africa,¹⁷ a shift occurred starting in 2017 and intensifying in 2019. This shift can be attributed to two concurrent factors: a pragmatic reevaluation of their approach and a genuine reassessment of the threats they face.

A notable realization emerged within the GCC countries: militarism, in many instances, proved to be an ineffective solution. This stemmed from its inability to achieve identified objectives and the damaging impact militarism had on their international reputation, exemplified by the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen War as well as the UAE’s military involvement in Libya, and the subsequent proposed suspension of arms sales to them by many Western countries that have historically been their main suppliers of weapons. Here, two things are worth noting. First, there exists a persistent belief within policy circles of the Global North that, if they withhold arms sales, another nation will step in, creating a reluctance to impose conditions or exercise restraint in arms transfers,¹⁸ often leading to a mere temporary or limited interruption in weapons flow. Second, even when there is a shift, such as the U.S. reconsidering its F-35 sale to the UAE, the decision is predominantly motivated by broader considerations related to global competition rather than the immediate and dramatic consequences of militarism, such as the war crimes in Yemen. In any case, hesitations from their Western partners have prompted two responses from the GCC countries. One is the development of an indigenous military industry coupled with the very diversification of defense partners feared by their allies¹⁹ – with mixed results so far.²⁰ The other, however, entails a move toward a more pragmatic and transactional approach to complex regional challenges that focuses less on securitization and militarized strategies. This shift aligns partly with China’s strategic outlook, emphasizing cooperation and avoiding zero-sum games. The GCC countries, therefore, acknowledge the necessity for a flexible approach to address their interests in a rapidly changing global landscape, prompting a reconsideration of their policies and partnership dynamics.

In addition to their pragmatic reconsideration of militarism, GCC countries recognized the growing human-centered security risks that they face. The Gulf region is especially vulnerable to climate change, with predictions of potential uninhabitability by 2100 due to rising temperatures and humidity. Such environmental concerns, along with water scarcity and food security, forced a reevaluation of their threat definition, if not a complete overhaul in their threat prioritization. Gulf nations notably began to rein in CO2 emissions and diversify their economies away from fossil fuels. The COVID-19 pandemic also starkly underscored their human security challenges, highlighting the importance of public health security. The pandemic prompted proactive measures, including lockdowns and decontamination programs. Moreover, because it exposed socioeconomic disparities, particularly in the treatment of migrant workers who faced heightened risks, measures like revised labor laws and minimum wage adjustments were implemented during the pandemic.²¹ Gulf countries not only addressed these challenges domestically but also launched substantial humanitarian efforts, extending aid to various nations in need, including Iran.²² They also held talks amongst GCC countries in 2020 despite the Gulf crisis. These developments suggested a potential shift towards cooperation rather than competition and seemed to present opportunities for regional de-escalation and sustainable security.

Reflecting on the lessons of past, ineffective strategies and the emergence of novel challenges unaddressed by traditional militaristic approaches, GCC nations have not simply launched fresh domestic initiatives and regional endeavors. They have also prioritized new dynamics with external partners, which have the potential to significantly bolster South-South relations. A noteworthy instance of this approach is the GCC’s humanitarian diplomacy during the initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, which extended beyond the Gulf region and notably encompassed China. Later, the UAE championed a joint strategy aimed at assisting Beijing in becoming a prominent provider of healthcare services and testing kits to the Global South and the Global North alike. Conversely, many observers deemed a 2020 Russian proposal for renewed Gulf security as unlikely to materialize because “instead of placing human security at the center of the paradigm, it [omitted] it altogether.” Such a proposal would have reproduced U.S. mistakes of overemphasizing counterterrorism, which “has not served the Middle East well, and arguably contributed to fostering current conflicts by prioritizing the security interests of regimes over the welfare of people.”²³ A broader recognition of the importance of regional capacity building and human security has also been observed in the context of the Indian Ocean, as highlighted in a 2015 strategy document from the Indian navy.²⁴ The aim behind this paradigm shift is to foster a positive and favorable maritime environment, which could serve as a new baseline for future cooperation with GCC countries. Interestingly, these new strategic foundations also have the potential to prompt GCC countries to reevaluate their relations with Western nations, thereby injecting new energy into North-South relations.

Will GCC countries be able to seize the opportunity of their newfound regional and global status to pacify dynamics in the MENA region and beyond, or are they bound to produce and reproduce patterns of insecurity that are all too well-known? One influence on these potential outcomes will be the trend among GCC countries to exacerbate and export their multifaceted intra-regional competition, translating into mounting insecurity in many countries. Could a consolidated non-aligned Gulf part ways with such tendencies? 

Signs of Necessary Caution – Possible Reproduction of Traditional Patterns of Insecurity

One obstacle to a consolidated, non-aligned Gulf is that competition among GCC, rather than a unified effort, often characterizes their pursuit of sustainable security. While the region faces common challenges related to environmental sustainability and the need to diversify their economies, these nations engage in rivalrous dynamics that manifest in both the greening of their economies and the projection of their sustainable international images. In the quest for sustainable development, Gulf nations are vying for leadership roles in the global green economy. Each country aspires to become a hub for renewable energy, eco-friendly technologies, and environmentally responsible practices, not only to secure their future but also to enhance their international standing. This rivalry can manifest through investments in clean energy initiatives, sustainable urban planning, and the promotion of eco-tourism.²⁵ While this competition can drive progress in sustainable security, it also creates an environment where countries are more focused on outperforming each other rather than fostering genuine cooperation and knowledge-sharing.

Another facet of this rivalry relates to the projection of international images, which has drawn criticism as more window-dressing than concrete solutions with tangible results. Gulf countries seek to project themselves as responsible global actors, front-runners in climate action, and advocates of environmental sustainability. They host international events, such as the COP28 in the UAE, and commit to ambitious sustainability targets. But this image projection often prioritizes optics over genuine, long-term sustainability efforts, thereby limiting the depth of their commitment to the principles of sustainable security. Green-washing their economy and image, Gulf nations often find their efforts marred by visible cracks in the shine. 

Notably, projects like Masdar in the UAE and The Line in Saudi Arabia, initially touted as environmentally-friendly initiatives, have raised concerns due to their evolution into massive undertakings with a discernibly negative ecological footprint, casting doubt on their sustainability and exacerbating carbon emissions. These challenges are interconnected with a reluctance to transition away from rentier economic models. Although experts have noted a slight shift towards greening international relations, it is also important to note that arms deals remain at the forefront of strategic partnerships, casting a shadow over genuine commitment to sustainable security principles.

One paradox of GCC countries’ promotion of human-centered security solutions lies in their potential to perpetuate patterns of domination and oppression, thereby deepening the gap between governing regimes and their populations, where political stability and military security frequently outweigh other concerns. This contradiction was particularly evident in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the responses of GCC nations raised concerns about invasion of privacy, data collection and state surveillance, reflecting a regime-centric approach to addressing human security challenges.²⁶ This underscores the balance that must be struck when designing and employing human-centered security solutions, ensuring that they genuinely prioritize the welfare and empowerment of individuals rather than inadvertently consolidating power imbalances. 

This twist in the application of human-centered security solutions extends beyond the domestic level, reaching into the regional and global arenas. An illuminating case in point is the Abraham Accords, initially heralded as a promise for a more peaceful, secure, and ecologically cooperative future in the Middle East. However, beneath the veneer of these diplomatic agreements, an alternative reality comes to light as the accords have functioned as a conduit for increased arms sales and heightened military engagement among regional actors.²⁷ In doing so, they contribute to the consolidation of a network of MENA regimes characterized by dual militarization, both internally and externally. Furthermore, certain sustainable initiatives they have sparked, like Project Prosperity, a UAE-brokered Memorandum of Understanding between Israel and Jordan, have been criticized for facilitating “Israeli greenwashing of its energy security policies and settler eco-colonialism.”²⁸

Lastly, it is imperative to acknowledge the global context, where emerging human security concerns are often swiftly redefined as potential threats to conventionally understood political and military security (climate change may lead to increased migration, food security issues are reframed as struggles over access denial and global competitive pressures, etc.). This wide scope highlights complexities and contradictions in the pursuit of human-centered security, as geopolitical interests and military considerations continue to shape dynamics of security and cooperation in the Gulf, the MENA region, and well beyond.

In such a context, the emergence of the “rise of the rest” and the prospects for a 21st Century “non-aligned movement” may not necessarily herald a new global order. While leadership may shift, inequalities and insecurities could persist, with vulnerable populations, countries, and regions in the Global South still potentially lacking strong advocates. However, it is worth noting that the reemergence of the long-standing Palestinian issue amidst the tragic unfolding of events starting in October 2023 has the potential to trigger significant regional and international realignments, thereby reviving perspectives for deep changes to come in world affairs.²⁹

Footnotes

1: Ken Klippenstein, “Saudis Sought Oil Production Cut So Deep It Surprised Even Russia”, The Intercept, October 20, 2022, https://theintercept.com/2022/10/20/saudi-oil-production-cut/.

2: Emma Soubrier, “The UAE’s Message of Hope, Delivered With a Soft-Power Focus and Some Strategic Hedging”, AGSIW, April 22, 2021, https://agsiw.org/the-uaes-message-of-hope-delivered-with-a-soft-power-focus-and-some-strategic-hedging/; Jon Gambrell and Gerry Shih, “Chinese armed drones now flying across Mideast battlefields”, AP News, October 4, 2018, https://apnews.com/article/1da29d68e3cc47b58631768c1dcfa445; Gordon Lubold, “Secret Chinese Port Project in Persian Gulf Rattles U.S. Relations With U.A.E.”, The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-china-uae-military-11637274224.

3: Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World: Release 2.0, New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012.

4: Neil MacFarquhar, “Developing World Sees Double Standard in West’s Actions in Gaza and Ukraine”, The New York Times, October 23, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/23/us/ukraine-gaza-global-south-hypocrisy.html.

5: Carien du Plessis, Anait Miridzhanian and Bhargav Acharya, “BRICS welcomes new members in push to reshuffle world order”, Reuters, August 25, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-poised-invite-new-members-join-bloc-sources-2023-08-24/.

6: Mishel al-Mosaed, USSR-Gulf States relations since the British withdrawal from east of Suez (PhD thesis), Denver: University of Denver, 1990, p.156-157.

7: Emma Soubrier, “Evolving Foreign and Security Policies: A Comparative Study of Qatar and the UAE”, in Khalid Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli (eds.), The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies, New York: Routledge, 2016, p. 126.

8: Emma Soubrier, “The weaponized Gulf riyal politik(s) and shifting dynamics of the global arms trade”, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2020, pp. 49-57.

9: Emma Soubrier, “Global and regional crises, empowered Gulf rivals, and the evolving paradigm of regional security”, POMEPS Studies 34: Shifting Global Politics and the Middle East, Washington: POMEPS, March 2019, pp. 63-66.

10: These two trends are emphasized in my upcoming book as having distinctly bolstered the ascent of GCC countries on the global stage. The financialization of international relations underscores how capital movements and economic ventures increasingly dictate the global magnitude and sway of those who wield them. Additionally, what I label as the "egotization of international relations" underscores the centralization and hyper-personalization of power in numerous countries globally, aligning closely with the growing significance of interpersonal relations as the linchpin of their international engagements. See Emma Soubrier, Qatar and the UAE: Diverging Paths to Regional and Global Power, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rinner, 2024 (forthcoming).

11: Kristian Ulrichsen, The Gulf States in International Political Economy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016 and Adam Hanieh, Money, Markets, and Monarchies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

12: Armin Arefi, “Comment le Qatar et l’Arabie Saoudite s’affrontent en Egypte”, Le Point, August, 21, 2013, http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/comment-le-qatar-et-arabie-saoudite-s-affrontent-en-egypte-21-08-2013-1716008_24.php.

13: Anna Jacobs and Laure Foucher, “The Myth of an Emerging “Mideast NATO””, International Crisis Group, October 3, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula-israelpalestine/myth-emerging-mideast-nato.

14: Emma Soubrier, “Ego-balization versus Eco-operation: Prioritizing Human Security in the Face of Global Crises”, AGSIW, March 31, 2020, https://agsiw.org/ego-balization-versus-eco-operation-prioritizing-human-security-in-the-face-of-global-crises/.

15: Emma Ashford also argued that “because it is so ill-defined, great-power competition as a strategy—that is to say, competition for its own sake—…has the potential to be highly dangerous”. Emma Ashford, “U.S.-China Great-Power Competition Is a Recipe for Disaster”, Foreign Policy, April 1, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/01/china-usa-great-power-competition-recipe-for-disaster/.

16: Jean-Loup Samaan, “The New Middle East is dismissing great power competition—for now”, Atlantic Council, October 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-new-middle-east-is-dismissing-great-power-competition-for-now/ and Emma Soubrier, “Gulf Security in a Multipolar World: Power Competition, Diversified Cooperation”, AGSIW Issue Papers, Washington: AGSIW, March 2020.

17: Will Todman, “The Gulf Scramble for Africa: GCC states’ foreign policy laboratory”, CSIS Briefs, Washington: CSIS, November 2018 and International Crisis Group, “Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact”, ICG Middle East Report N°206, September 2019.

18: Emma Soubrier, “What is the role of the arms trade between Europe & North America and the MENA region?”, PRISME Initiative, July 2023, p. 9; Elias Yousif, “The Fear of Missing Out – Reconsidering Assumptions in US Arms Transfers to the Middle East”, PRISME Initiative, May 19, 2023, https://prismeinitiative.org/blog/fear-of-missing-out-elias-yousif/.

19: Shady Mansour, “Diversifying Saudi’s security: Would the US security architecture in the Middle East be threatened?”, PRISME Initiative, June 5, 2023, https://prismeinitiative.org/blog/diversifying-saudis-security-would-the-us-security-architecture-in-the-middle-east-be-threatened/.

20: While the UAE for instance procured most of its military equipment from domestic companies for the first time at IDEX 2023, there is a lot to be said about the storytelling surrounding such information (announcements of domestic contracts made during the exhibition while major defense contracts are still signed with foreign companies the rest of the year). And while Gulf arms procurement increasingly reflects multipolarity and power competition, the move to alternatives is not substantial yet. See Emma Soubrier, “Gulf Security in a Multipolar World: Power Competition, Diversified Cooperation”.

21: In August 2020, Qatar increased its minimum wage by 25% and eliminated the requirement for workers to obtain employer permission to switch jobs, a move hailed by Amnesty International as positive progress. A month later, Saudi Arabia also announced reforms aimed at liberating millions of low-paid and vulnerable migrant workers from employer restrictions. “Qatar Raises Minimum Wage, Lifts Curbs on Changing Jobs,” Reuters, August 30, 2020; “Qatar: New Laws To Protect Migrant Workers are a Step in the Right Direction,” Amnesty International, August 30, 2020; Aya Batrawy, “Saudi Arabia To Remove Key Restrictions on Migrant Laborers,” The Washington Post, November 4, 2020.

22: Elham Fakhro, “COVID and Gulf Foreign Policy”, The Covid-19 Pandemic in the Middle East and North Africa, Washington: Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), April 2020.

23: Sanam Vakil and Neil Quiliam, “Steps to enable a Middle East regional security process”, Chatham House Research Paper, London: Chatham House, April 2021.

24: See Abhijit Singh, “India’s Evolving Maritime Posture in the Indian Ocean: Opportunities for the Gulf”, EDA Insight, Abu Dhabi: Emirates Diplomatic Academy, August 2020.

25: Mohammad Al-Saidi, “Cooperation or competition? State environmental relations and the SDGs agenda in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region”, Environmental Development, Vol. 37, March 2021; Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, “The Race to Net Zero: Saudi Arabia and the UAE Compete over Climate Action”, Gulf International Forum, April 28, 2023, https://gulfif.org/the-race-to-net-zero-saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-compete-over-climate-action/.

26: Emma Soubrier, “Redefining Gulf Security Begins by Including the Human Dimension”, AGSIW, November 2020.

27: Tariq Dana, “The Geopolitics of the Abraham Accords: A Critical View on Militarization”, PRISME Initiative, June 16, 2023 and Heba Taha, “Industries and Identities of War: Militarism, Nationalism, and Arab-Israeli Normalization,” PRISME Initiative, November 9, 2023.

28: Nico Edwards, “Foreign Policy for Ecological Justice or Ecological Colonialism? Troubling US and German Eco-Militarized Relations with Israel”, PRISME Initiative, October 13, 2023.

29: This is supported by the increasing number of countries of the Global South demanding that action be taken against Israel in the context of the case brought to the ICJ by South Africa accusing it of genocide. On the other hand, the fact that most Western countries still support Tel Aviv in the face of its continued and blatant violations of international law could also suggest that “the rules-based order that has governed international affairs since the end of World War II is on its way out, and there may be no turning back” (Agnès Callamard, “Gaza and the End of the Rules-Based Order”, Foreign Affairs, February 15, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/gaza-and-end-rules-based-order ). Sadly, such an acceleration of the emergence of a lawless order would leave vulnerable populations even more exposed than before.

Dr. Emma Soubrier is Director of the PRISME initiative. She is also an Associate Researcher with the Institute for Peace and Development at the Université Côte d’Azur’s LADIE International and European Law Department (Nice, France) and an Associated Researcher with the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Boston, USA). Over the past dozen years, her research has focused on the security strategies and foreign policies of the Gulf countries as well as the political economy of the global arms trade. Emma is an expert with the Forum on Arms Trade and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW). Her work promotes a renewed approach to security in the Middle East that no longer focuses merely on political and military aspects but includes a broader look at people-centered dimensions of security (human security, particularly societal security and environmental security).